The implications of status preference in a simple open economy model are investigated in this paper. The open economy is modeled as a continuum of identical representative agents who have preferences over consumption and status. In the paper status is identified as relative wealth, which takes the form of relative holdings international financial assets. A symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium is derived in which status is the source of transitional dynamics for domestic consumption and the current account balance. This result illustrates another way to combine transitional dynamics with interior equilibria in the small open economy Ramsey model with perfect capital mobility. We also show that status preference plays a critical role in influencing the open economy's adjustment to government expenditure and world interest rate shocks.
INTRODUCTION
In standard economic theory an individual's utility is usually specified in terms of the absolute levels of goods and services. This standard specification is intuitively appealing and adequate to study many economic problems. Evidence provided by Easterlin (1974 Easterlin ( , 1995 suggests, however, that an individual's economic well-being is a function of his position, or status, in society, along with his absolute level of consumption, income or wealth. The idea that individuals possess preferences for relative position is a timehonored one in economics and can be traced back to thinkers such as David Hume (1978) and Thorstein Veblen (1899) , among others. The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of status preference in a small open economy model.
While authors such as Frank (1985) have modeled the influence of status preference in a static setting, there are an increasing number of researchers who study status preference in a dynamic macroeconomic or endogenous growth context. These include Galí (1994) , Corneo and Jeanne (1997) , Rauscher (1997) , Futagami and Shibata (1998) and Fisher and Hof (2000) . Their work illustrates two ways in which status can be modeled in a macroeconomic setting. The approach adopted by Galí (1994) , Rauscher (1997) and Fisher and Hof (2000) specifies that status preference derives from relative consumption. In contrast, Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and Futagami and Shibata (1998) represent status preference as arising from relative wealth, which these researchers measure in terms of physical capital. In this paper we also identify status as relative wealth, but model it in terms of international assets rather than in terms of physical capital. Furthermore, while all these authors model the role of status preference in a closed economy context, we consider this question in an open economy framework. We believe this is an important extension of this line of research due to the increasing integration of the world economy and the greater role of international assets in wealth accumulation. A paper that does model the implications of relative wealth preferences in the open economy is the recent work of Hof and Wirl (2002) , who analyze the possibility of multiple equilibria and their stability properties in the context of the small open economy Ramsey model. In contrast to their analysis, this paper focuses on how a small open economy with a specific form of relative wealth preferences responds to standard macroeconomic shocks.
The present work is, in addition, related to the recent Spirit of Capitalism literature, which is represented by authors such as Cole et al. (1992) , Zou (1994 Zou ( , 1998 and Bakshi and Chen (1996) , who seek to explain growth, savings and asset pricing behavior. This research, based on the ideas of Max Weber (1958) , views wealth accumulation as the means of achieving social status, which itself enables agents to acquire goods that are regarded as 'prizes' by society at large. Spirit of Capitalism models can then be interpreted as reduced-form versions of explicit microeconomic models in which agents contend to gain such goods.
A further motivation for our approach is to offer an alternative solution to a long-standing issue in open economy macroeconomics: the fact that the small open economy under the assumption of perfect capital mobility does not have plausible transitional dynamics if the domestic rate of time preference differs from the exogenous world interest rate. For example, if the domestic rate of time preference exceeds the world interest rate, i.e. the economy is 'impatient', then agents eventually mortgage all of their capital and labor income. On the other hand, the most 'patient' country acquires over time the wealth of all other countries. 1 One way to avoid this dilemma is to assume that the domestic rate of time preference equals the world interest rate. The small open economy then attains an interior equilibrium. Unless, however, the further modifications are incorporated into the model, this condition rules out the possibility of transitional dynamics, because it also 1. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, pp. 98-101) , for a discussion of these counterfactual cases. fixes a given stock of physical capital or assets. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Turnovsky (1997) discuss several ways in which transitional dynamics can be combined with interior equilibria in the small open economy, representative agent context. 2 One approach that has been extensively used (see, for example , Brock, 1988; Sen and Turnovsky, 1989a , 1989b , 1990 Frenkel et al., 1996) , is to incorporate into the small open economy model a convex installation cost function for investment demand. While the equality between the domestic rate of time preference and the world interest rate must still be imposed in this framework, the domestic capital stock (and output) will adjust sluggishly to maintain the equality between the rates of return of domestic and foreign assets.
The problematic 'zero root' feature of the representative agent, small open economy model does not, however, arise in the finite-lived, overlapping generations framework of which the Blanchard (1985) model, drawing on the fundamental work of Yaari (1965) , is an infinite horizon variant. Applications of the Blanchard (1985) model in the small open economy context are found in Weil (1989) , who explores the issue of Ricardian equivalence, and Engel and Kletzer (1990) , who study the effects of changes in tariffs on intergenerational savings behavior.
Still another, though more controversial, approach to restoring transitional dynamics in the small open economy model is to specify that agents possess Uzawa (1968)-type, time-dependent, endogenous rates of time preference. 3 Authors such as Blanchard and Fischer (1989) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Turnovsky (1997) find this formulation intuitively unappealing, however, because a necessary condition in the infinite horizon context to generate saddlepoint dynamics is that the rate of time preference increases with the level of consumption. 4 Obstfeld (1990) , drawing on the work of Epstein (1987) , among others, offers a defense of this approach and points out its usefulness in relaxing the assumption of time-additive preferences, which is also restrictive.
Two other approaches to this question are to assume the existence of costs of holding foreign bonds or to specify an upward-sloping supply curve of debt. Both approaches seek to model, in a certainty equivalent framework, the macroeconomic implications of the imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets. The first approach was taken by Turnovsky (1985) , while the second has been adopted by authors such as Bhandari et al. (1990) . Using these specifications, interior solutions are obtained without imposing equality between the rate of time preference and the world interest rate. Because asset stocks will, as a consequence, adjust slowly according to international asset arbitrage, economies that incorporate these specifications exhibit transitional dynamics. One issue that arises in these two cases is the fact that the existence of transitional or degenerate dynamics often depends on the macroeconomic shock in question. 5 In addition, it can be argued that it is preferable to model the implications of international capital market imperfections, which depend, in part, on the risk characteristics of domestic and foreign assets, in an explicitly stochastic setting. In this paper, we show that our specification of status preference leads to a transitional dynamic equilibrium and argue that it generates, at least in our simple framework, more sensible predictions concerning the comparative dynamic response to selected macroeconomic shocks than do some of the competing approaches discussed here. 6 In order to concentrate on the influence of status preference, we adopt in this paper a very simple open economy specification. We assume that agents receive a given endowment of real income, consume a single real good tradable at a unitary world price, and lend (or borrow) at an exogenously determined world interest rate. 7 Using an intertemporal optimizing, perfectforesight framework, we derive a symmetric equilibrium in which identical agents act in the same way. We show that the open economy's transitional dynamics arise from agents' preference for relative wealth. That is, our formulation of status preference results in an 'effective' domestic rate of return that is endogenously determined outside of steady-state equilibrium. This, in turn, results in transitional dynamics for consumption and the current account balance. We also incorporate a public sector into our model in order to determine how the open economy with status preference responds to government expenditure shocks. 8 In addition, we model the implications of world interest rate shocks.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section, Section 2, describes the model and derives the symmetric, intertemporal equilibrium. Section 3 calculates the effects of government expenditure and world interest rate shocks on the intertemporal dynamics of the small open economy. In this section we employ phase diagrams to describe the transitional adjustment of consumption and national debt in response to these macroeconomic disturbances. We close in Section 4 with concluding remarks 5. Fisher (1995) and Fisher and Terrell (2000) show that the upward-sloping debt specification is useful, however, in investigating the implications of world interest rate disturbances. 6. Since, as we describe below, output is fixed in our model, our results are not directly comparable to those derived from the specification that uses an installation cost of investment function. 7. See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 60-73) for a recent exposition of the small open economy endowment model. 8. Obstfeld (1989) uses a small open economy model of infinitely-lived, non-altruistic households to study the impact of fiscal disturbances. In this paper, the factor markets of traded and non-traded goods are crucial in transmitting the effects of fiscal policy. and offer some suggestions for future work. A brief mathematical appendix is also included.
THE MODEL AND INTERTEMPORAL EQUILIBRIUM
We introduce the model by assuming that there are a large number of representative agents, each of whom has the following instantaneous preferences over own consumption, c, status, s, which we identify with relative wealth, a/A, and government spending, g:
Zðc; s; gÞ Uðc; sÞ þ VðgÞ ¼ Uðc; a=AÞ þ VðgÞ ð 1aÞ
where a is individual wealth and A is aggregate, or average, wealth and all variables in the model are denominated in real terms. 9 In our formulation, government expenditure, which enters additively in (1a), is a pure public good, enjoyed equally by all agents. 10 We further specify that U(c, a/A) is increasing and strictly concave in both consumption and status and that V(g) is increasing and strictly concave in government expenditure:
In order to focus on the influence of status preference, we make simple assumptions regarding the open economy's technological and financial market possibilities. 11 Specifically, we assume that the agent receives a given endowment of income, denoted by y y, which is traded internationally at a fixed, unitary world price. In addition, we specify that agents lend (or borrow) at the exogenously given world interest rate, equal to r * , and accumulate wealth in the form of domestic government bonds or international assets, which are perfect substitutes. (The domestic public sector is introduced in more detail below.) Employing an infinite horizon, perfect foresight framework, the agent's maximization problem is formulated as follows:
9. We restrict our analysis to the case in which the economy achieves an interior equilibrium with c40, a/A40, a40, A40. The conditions under which this holds are derived below. As such, our formulation rules out the possibility that private agents are equilibrium net debtors. See, however, Hof and Wirl (2002) , who investigate precisely this situation. 10. In other words, government expenditure in (1a) is not scaled by aggregate use, i.e. there are no 'congestion effects' in this formulation. 11. For a variable x, x x denotes a non-policy variable fixed at a constant level, while _ x x indicates that its time derivative is being taken. The partial derivatives of functions are denoted by subscripts. Note that in general we suppress a variable's time dependence.
Status Preference, Wealth and Dynamics in the Open Economy r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 where r is the exogenous rate of pure time preference, t is the given level of lump-sum taxes, and a 0 is the agent's initial endowment of wealth. Regarding the domestic time rate of preference, we assume that it exceeds the world interest rate, r > r * , which implies that the domestic economy is relatively 'impatient'. 12 Solving this optimization problem, we obtain the following first-order conditions for the representative agent:
where l the current co-state variable. Equation (3a) is the necessary condition for consumption, while (3b) describes the evolution of the shadow value if individual asset accumulation is chosen optimally. In performing the maximization, the agent ignores the effect of his choice of a on A. 13 Observe that the evolution of l in (3b) depends on the agent's status preference, which is embodied in the partial derivative U s ðc; a=AÞ. We next impose the following transversality condition that constrains the limiting dynamics of private sector asset accumulation:
The next step is to derive the intertemporal macroeconomic equilibrium. Following the standard procedure for this type of problem, we assume that each identical individual acts in the same way and normalize the population of agents to unity. This implies a ¼ A holds 8t ! 0 and results in the following symmetric private sector equilibrium:
together with the transversality condition (3c). 14 We now incorporate the domestic public sector into the equilibrium and state the following flow government budget constraint
12. We show below that r > r* is a necessary condition for the saddlepoint stability. 13. From the point of view of the agent, the level of government expenditure g is, of course, also an exogenous variable. Moreover, since (1a) is additively separable in government expenditure, the optimality conditions (3a, b) are independent of g. 14. For the remainder of the paper, lowercase variables refer to their economy-wide aggregates.
where b is the stock of government debt, g represents government spending, and, as indicated above, t is the level of lump-sum taxes. The government can borrow either from the domestic private sector or from abroad at the prevailing world interest rate r * and spends, or absorbs, real resources g. We further assume that the accumulation of government debt is subject to the following No-Ponzi-Game (NPG) condition: 15
To obtain the overall macroeconomic equilibrium, we introduce the variable z b À a, which is equal to the economy's net (or national) indebtedness. This is done in order to permit the small open economy as a whole be a net debtor, while, at the same time, maintaining our assumption that the private sector is a net creditor, which we believe to be a realistic situation. Subtracting (4c) from (5a), we obtain the following expression for the accumulation of net debt, which is equal to the (negative) of the current account balance:
Substituting a 5 b À z into equation (4b), we can state the open economy's equilibrium dynamics as
where the expressions for _ z z and _ b b are repeated for expositional purposes. In order to simplify further the economy's dynamic structure, we assume that the fiscal policy authorities maintain a continuously balanced budget, i.e.
where bðtÞ b b is the constant stock of government debt, which we can identify, without loss of generality, with its exogenous initial stock, b 0 . Under this fiscal policy rule, the dynamics of the open economy collapse to equations (7a, b) -with b replaced by b 0 in (7a) -and the private sector transversality condition (3c).
As an aid to intuition, it is useful to recast the equilibrium dynamics in terms of the control variable c, domestic consumption. To do so, we take the time derivative of (3a), evaluated in the symmetric equilibrium, equate the 15. Aside from the NPG condition, we do not make any further assumptions regarding the government's behavior. We regard it, then, as 'non-optimizing'. This is done in order to focus on the implications of a 'pure' aggregate demand shock emerging from the public sector. 
are, respectively, the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution, s e c ð Þ, and the effective domestic, or internal, rate of return on assets, r e ðr * ; b 0 ; z; cÞ. Observe that the effective rate of return is equal to the sum of the world interest rate and the marginal rate of substitution of own assets for consumption in the symmetric equilibrium in which the condition a ¼ A holds. The latter term represents the additional return to savings that accrues to domestic agents due to status preference. The domestic rate of return r e is, consequently, not fixed parametrically, which implies that the small open economy has ( potentially) saddlepoint stable transitional dynamics. To see this, assume, instead, that agents have standard concave preferences solely over own consumption (and public goods), so that (1a) equals Zðc; gÞ ¼
where sðcÞ ¼ ÀU c ðcÞ=cU cc ðcÞ is the standard elasticity of substitution. Since r * and r are both fixed constants, equation (10) implies that r * ¼ r must hold in order for the open economy to reach a well-defined, interior equilibrium. However this means, as we discussed in the introduction, that the small open economy exhibits no transitional dynamics, since _ c c ¼ _ z z ¼ 0, 8t ! 0 in this case. We would also obtain this result if status corresponded to relative consumption rather than to relative wealth, i.e. if (1a) were specified as U ¼ Uðc; sÞ ¼ Uðc; c=CÞ, where C would represent aggregate, or average, consumption. 16 With this formulation, only the static levels of consumption and its marginal utility would be affected by status preference. 17 In moving to a characterization of the economy's dynamic and equilibrium properties, it is convenient to introduce the following constant elasticity parameterization of Uðc; sÞ in (1a): 18 16. See, however, the model of Fisher and Hof (2000) in which relative consumption does influence equilibrium dynamics in a closed economy, endogenous growth context. 17. The static marginal utility is derived from the relative consumption version of equation (3a), which is given by U c ðc; 1Þ þ c À1 U s ðc; 1Þ ¼ l in the symmetric equilibrium. 18. The partial derivatives of (11) are stated in the Appendix. Using these expressions, we show that (11) satisfies the curvature conditions stated in (1b).
Uðc; sÞ
Using this specification of preferences, the Euler equation (9a) becomes
where the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution s e ðcÞ and the effective rate of return r e r * ; b 0 ; z; c ð Þon assets are, respectively, equal to:
Clearly, both s e and r e depend on the parameter d, which represents the private sector's attitude toward status in equation (11). It is straightforward to show that an increase in the status parameter d raises (resp. lowers) s e if a > 1 (resp. a < 1) and that a rise in d increases r e . In addition, because both higher levels of consumption and national debt raise the marginal rate of substitution between own assets and consumption, both (in partial equilibrium) increase the effective rate of return r e . 19 Letting (7b) and (12b), we calculate the following steady-state solutions for consumption, national debt and the effective rate of return:c c ¼ ð1 À dÞðr À r * Þð y y À g À r * b 0 Þ ð1 À dÞr À r * ð13aÞ z z ¼ Àdð y y À gÞ þ ð1 À dÞðr À r * Þb 0 ð1 À dÞr À r * ð13bÞ
wherex x denotes the steady-state value of a variable x. Using the definitioñ a a b 0 Àz z, the long-run solution for the private sector's asset position is, in turn, given by:ã
In order to guarantee an interior, positive solution for steady-state consumption and private sector asset holdings, we impose the following conditions on the structural parameters of the small open economy:
19. This means that the positive relationship in our model between the effective rate of return and the stock of national debt arises from status preference rather than from capital market imperfections. The first condition of (13e) requires that the (fixed) level of output exceeds government expenditure plus interest service on the inherited stock of public debt, while the second condition in (13e), which is a necessary condition for the existence of a saddlepoint equilibrium, restricts the values that the status parameter d can take. 20 Equations (13a, d) show thatc c andã a are larger the greater is (fixed) output, net of government expenditure and public sector interest service. From (13b), it is clear that steady-state national debt,z z, can take positive or negative values. Furthermore, the greater is the initial stock of public debt, b 0 , the larger is the level of steady-state national indebtedness. The opposite is the case, in contrast, the greater is the level of (fixed) output net of government expenditure, ð y y À gÞ. For expositional purposes, we restrict our analysis to cases in which the small open economy is a net debtor in steady-state equilibrium, i.e.z z > 0. From (13b), this requires that we impose the following additional restriction on the structural parameters of the model:
Finally, equation (13c) states that the long-run value of the effective rate of return is pinned down by the exogenous rate of time preference. 21 Taking first-order approximations of (7b) and (12a) around the steady-state solutions (13a, b), we derive the following matrix differential equation:
where
The stability properties of this system are determined by the signs of the trace and determinant of the coefficient matrix of (14). These are given, respectively, by
where m 1 , m 2 are the corresponding eigenvalues of the dynamic system. For 20. The first condition can be rewritten as b 0 < y y À g ð Þ=r*, which says that the initial stock of public debt cannot exceed the present discounted value of output net of government expenditure. Clearly, the second condition is equivalent to the restriction that the status parameter d not exceed the ratio r À r* ð Þ =r. For example, if r ¼ 0:04 and r* ¼ 0:02, then d cannot exceed 0:5. 21. Since the expressions for the _ c c ¼ 0 and _ z z ¼ 0 equations for the parameterized model are linear (see equations (18) below) in c and z, we can rule out multiple steady-state equilibria. The conditions in (13e) guarantee, in turn, that the steady-state equilibrium defined by (13a)-(13d) is a unique, interior saddlepoint. the equilibrium of (14a) to be a saddlepoint, m 1 m 2 must be negative. Using the expressions for the matrix elements y 11 , y 12 in (14b), we find that the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (14b) equals:
Since this expression is negative under our assumptions r > r * , 1 À d ð Þr À r * ½ > 0 and our specification of preferences in (11), the equilibrium of (14a) is a saddlepoint, with m 1 < 0, m 2 > 0, m 1 j < m 2 j . Using standard methods, we then obtain the following saddlepath solutions for consumption and national debt:
where z adjusts from an exogenous initial stock, z 0 . 22 Combining the solutions (17a, b), we obtain the stable saddlepath that describes the stable co-movements of consumption and net debt:
c Àc c ð Þ¼Àðr * À m 1 Þðz Àz zÞ ¼ Ày 12 y 11 À m 1 ðz Àz zÞ ð 17cÞ
The graph of this locus has a negative slope, implying that consumption and national debt adjust in opposite directions along the saddlepath, i.e. sgnð _ c cÞ ¼ Àsgnð _ z zÞ. We can derive the phase diagram, illustrated by Figure 1 , of the dynamic system (14a). Using equations (7b) and (12a), the _ c c ¼ 0 and _ z z ¼ 0 loci are described, respectively, by:
Observe that the slope of the _ c c ¼ 0 locus, equal to ðdc=dzÞ _ c c¼0 ¼ j Àð1 À dÞðr À r * Þ=d < 0; is negative and depends on the size of the status parameter d. For instance, the greater the weight the private sector attaches to status, i.e. the larger is d, the flatter will be the _ c c ¼ 0 locus. The _ z z ¼ 0 locus, in contrast, is independent of consumer preferences and has a slope equal to dc=dz ð Þ _ z z¼0 À r * < 0 j . The condition 1 À d ð Þr À r * ½ > 0 in (13e) is necessary for a saddlepoint equilibrium means that the slope of the _ c c ¼ 0 locus exceeds the slope of the _ z z ¼ 0 locus in absolute value. Furthermore, the first equality 22. Because m 1 is an eigenvalue of coefficient matrix of (14a), ðr* À m 1 Þ ¼ y 12 =ðy 11 À m 1 Þ. of (17c) implies that the slope of _ z z ¼ 0 is smaller in absolute value than that of the stable saddlepath. Graphically, note that condition (13f ) guaranteeing z z > 0 implies that the _ c c ¼ 0 locus intersects the vertical axis above the _ z z ¼ 0 locus. The intersection of the _ c c ¼ 0 and _ z z ¼ 0 loci is illustrated by point A in Figure 1 and determines the steady-state values ofc c andz z calculated above in (13a, b) .
We also employ the solutions for consumption and national debt to solve for the path of the effective rate of return, r e . First, we linearize the parameterized expression for the effective rate of return, equation (12b), about its steady-state value of r. This yields:
ðc Àc cÞ Àc c ðb 0 Àz zÞ ðz Àz zÞ ð19aÞ
Substituting the second equality of (17a) and the solution for z given in (17b) into (19a), we obtain the following expression for the path of r e :
This solution is simplified by substituting for y 11 , y 12 and using the fact that
where the latter expression is calculated using equations (13a, d). Making these substitutions in (19b) and evaluating the resulting expression, we show the stable solution for the effective rate of return equals:
.
Figure 1 Phase diagram
The solution for r e states that if z 0 <z z (resp. z 0 >z z), then r e < r (resp. r e > r) along the stable saddlepath. Consequently, it is the case that sgnð _ r r e Þ 5 sgnð _ z zÞ during the transition to steady-state equilibrium.
COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS
In this section we describe the dynamic response of consumption and national debt in the small open economy to unanticipated permanent government expenditure and world interest rate shocks. To calculate the steady-state effects of these disturbances, we employ the steady-state solutions, equations (13a, b), derived in the previous section. The transitional responses of the small open economy are calculated using stable saddlepath solutions given above in equations (17a, b) and are illustrated with phase diagrams based on Figure 1. 
Fiscal shocks
A permanent, balanced-budget increase in government expenditure has the following steady-state impact on consumption and national debt:
In response to the rise in g, consumption falls and the stock of national debt increases in long-run equilibrium. In terms of Figure 2a , this corresponds to a shift in the _ z z ¼ 0 locus to the left, which results in a new intersection with the _ c c ¼ 0 locus at point C, which involves a greater long-run stock of national debt and lower level of steady-state domestic consumption. We observe from equation (20a) that the long-run fall in consumption exceeds in absolute value the rise in government expenditure. In other words, government expenditure shocks have a multiplier effect on steady-state consumption in our model of status preference. This result is easily explained using Figure 2a . Evaluating the first equality of (17a) at t ¼ 0 and substituting for the steady-state comparative statics expressions in equations (20a, b), the initial response of consumption equals: 23
In terms of Figure 2a , this corresponds to the fall in c(0) from point A to point B, which lies on the new saddlepath corresponding to the new steady-state 23. Using the second equality of (17a), it is straightforward to show that the initial jump in cð0Þ is unambiguously negative. equilibrium at point C. From equation (21), it is evident that the fall in consumption at t 5 0 is less than the corresponding decrease in disposable income. As such, this fiscal expansion also lowers private savings at t 5 0. This reflects the fact that status -in the form of relative wealth -and consumption are both normal goods in this economy. Consequently, the private sector dissaves during the transition along the saddlepath BC, which, in the symmetric equilibrium, leads to a deterioration in the small open economy's aggregate asset position, i.e. an increase inz z. Combined with the increase in lump-sum taxation to support the higher level of g, the reduction in private interest income results in a decline in steady-state consumption that is greater in absolute value than the rise in public expenditure. Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that the long-run responses of consumption and net debt are greater, the larger is the status parameter d. In terms of Figure 2a , a larger value of d corresponds to a 'flatter' _ c c ¼ 0 locus. This implies, in turn, that greater changes inc c andz z take place subsequent to a given shift in the _ z z ¼ 0 locus.
In Figure 2a , this process is depicted by the adjustment of net debt and consumption along the stable locus from point B to point C in which _ z z > 0, Figure 2 (a) Increase in government expenditure; (b) increase in the world rate, case 1; (c) increase in the world rate, case 2; (d) increase in the world rate, case 3 _ c c < 0. These results stand in sharp contrast to those that would obtain if consumer preferences were a function solely of own consumption, i.e. if U ¼ UðcÞ, or if status depended on relative consumption rather than on relative wealth, i.e. if U ¼ Uðc; c=CÞ. Because the Euler relationship in both of these cases then collapses to equation (10), there are no transitional dynamics subsequent to the increase in public expenditure, only an immediate one-forone decrease in consumption with no change in the equilibrium stock of national debt. We can also describe impact of this fiscal shock on the effective rate of return, r e . Using the expressions for r e given above in equations (12b) and (19d), we can show that the initial response of effective return equals:
Thus, the effective rate of return initially falls subsequent to the increase in g. This reflects the fact that initial fall in consumption lowers the marginal rate of substitution between own assets and consumption. After t ¼ 0, the effective rate of return then rises toward its steady-state value of r from below. 24 We are now in a position to ask how the response of the economy to the public expenditure disturbance would differ if, instead, agents possessed Uzawa (1968)-type preferences, leaving the rest of the economic structure unchanged. 25 We can show that in response to an increase in g -in contrast to our results -that the long-run stock of debtz z falls, while the steady-state level of consumptionc c remains unchanged. This is brought about by an initial decline in consumption that falls short (in absolute value) of the rise in government expenditure and lump-sum taxes. Agents with Uzawa (1968)-type preferences then save during the entire transition to the steady-state equilibrium, which lowers the stock of national debtz z and brings long-run consumption back to its original, pre-fiscal disturbance level.
If, on the other hand, the economy is characterized by an upward-sloping debt function and preferences depend solely on own consumption, then we can show that consumption immediately falls one-for-one with the increase 24. Although it is not our focus here, the adjustment of consumption and net assets affects agents' intertemporal welfare. Through VðgÞ in (1a), the fiscal expansion has, in addition, a direct impact on consumer welfare. Status Preference, Wealth and Dynamics in the Open Economy r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 in g. 26 Since there are no transitional dynamics in this case, the stock of national debt is completely unaffected by the income shock. 27 In our view, the dynamic response of the small open economy under our specification of status preference is more plausible, compared to these alternative approaches, because the burden of long-run adjustment falls on both domestic consumption and national debt. 28 Finally, we can compare our results to those that would arise in the Blanchard-Yaari-Weil framework. It is straightforward to show, under the assumption that agents are relatively impatient, that a permanent, balanced-budget, increase in public expenditure causes national indebtedness to decline, since impatient households borrow relatively less out of the correspondingly lower stock of human wealth. 29
World interest shocks
Finally, we consider the dynamic impact of an increase in the world interest rate, r * . Unlike the long-run effects of the domestic fiscal disturbance, a rise in the world interest rate has an ambiguous impact on the steady-state values of consumption and national debt. Differentiating equations (13a, b) with respect to r * , we obtain the following expressions for the changes iñ c c andz z:
The restrictions we imposed in (13e, f ) to guaranteec c > 0,ã a > 0 andz z > 0, are insufficient to sign the comparative statics expressions (23a, b). Nevertheless, two cases can be identified that depend on the relative shifts in the _ c c ¼ 0 and _ z z ¼ 0 loci. It is straightforward to show that the rise in r * causes both the 26. In the context of our model, the upward-sloping debt function would be equal to:
where cðzÞ describes the relationship between national indebtedness and the domestic interest rate rðzÞ. We can also show that the cost of adjusting bonds specification yields results qualitatively similar to those derived in the upward-sloping debt function approach. 27. As indicated in the introduction, world interest rate shocks lead, however, to transitional dynamic responses for c and z. 28. Turnovsky and Sen (1991) analyze the effects of government expenditure policy in the installation cost of investment framework. They show that a permanent increase in g will lower the stock of domestic credit and the level of consumption in steady-state equilibrium. Their result relies, however, on the positive effect of the fiscal expansion on employment and capital accumulation that are not features of the present model. 29. For an exposition of the Blanchard-Yaari-Weil model in the context of a small open economy with fixed output, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 181-191) .
_ c c ¼ 0 locus and the _ z z ¼ 0 locus to shift to the left. 30 In the first case, depicted in Figure 2b , the horizontal shift in the _ c c ¼ 0 locus exceeds that of the _ z z ¼ 0 locus and results in a new equilibrium, illustrated at point E, that corresponds to a higher value ofc c and a lower value ofz z. 31 In the second case, depicted in Figure 2c , the horizontal shift in the _ z z ¼ 0 locus exceeds that of the _ c c ¼ 0 locus, which implies that long-run consumption -along with national debtfalls. The new long-run equilibrium in this case is illustrated by point G. In both instances consumption falls at t ¼ 0 before rising along the new saddlepaths. 32 This is depicted in Figure 2b by the movement from point D to point E and in Figure 2c by the movement from point F to point G. Intuitively, the difference between the two cases is that in the first case, Figure  2b , the accumulation of private sector assets and, thus, interest income, is sufficiently great to allow for a higher level of long-run consumption, while in the second case, Figure 2c , this effect is insufficiently strong. In general, the impact of higher asset income is greater the larger is (fixed) output net of government expenditure, y y À g ð Þ, and the smaller is the inherited stock of government debt, b 0 .
Finally, we can identify a third case, illustrated in Figure 2d , in which a rise in r * leads to an increase in national debt as well as to a decline in consumption. As in Figure 2c , the horizontal shift in the _ z z ¼ 0 locus exceeds that of the _ c c ¼ 0 locus. The shift in the _ z z ¼ 0 locus in Figure 2d is, however, sufficiently great so that the new point of intersection now corresponds to point G 0 , which involves both higherz z and lowerc c. In this case, agents decumulate assets along the saddlepath F 0 G 0 , due to the relatively large increase in lump-sum taxes required to support the rise in public sector debt service. This is caused by the fact that in this case the economy inherits a relatively large stock of government debt, b 0 , compared to the level of (fixed) output net of government expenditure, ð y y À gÞ. 33 Observe also that due to the 30. Evaluated in the steady-state equilibrium, the horizontal shifts in the _ c c ¼ 0 and _ z z ¼ 0 loci are given by Àðb 0 Àz zÞ=ðr À r*Þ and Àz z=r*, respectively. We can show that the shift in the _ c c ¼ 0 locus exceeds (resp. is less than) the shift in _ z z ¼ 0 locus as b 0 exceeds (resp. is less than) rz z=r*. It is also clear that slopes of _ c c ¼ 0 and _ z z ¼ 0 loci as well as that of the saddlepath change when the world interest rate increases. We do not, however, illustrate the shifts in these slopes in order to simplify the graphical exposition of these cases. 31. This result would unambiguously obtain if, instead, the economy possessed the Uzawa-type preferences discussed above. This is due to the fact that since the rate of time preference then depends positively on consumption, it must be the case thatc c increases if r* rises. For the upward-sloping debt specification, we can show that while the response ofc c to the increase in r* can either be positive or negative, the steady-state stock of national debt unambiguously declines. 32. Even though initial consumption falls, the direct effect of a higher world interest rate will increase the effective rate of return r e . 33. Using equation (23b), the condition that the rise in r* leads to an increasez z is given by b 0 =ð y y À gÞ ½ > ½1= 1 À d ð Þr. Clearly, the larger is d, the greater is the value of b 0 , given ð y y À gÞ, that satisfies this condition.
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CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The goal of this paper is to study the implications for status, modeled as relative wealth, in a small open economy framework. In order to focus on the role of status preference, we select a simple one-good model in which output is fixed and agents could lend (and borrow) at the given world interest rate. We derive a symmetric dynamic equilibrium in which status preference is the source of transitional dynamics. This is the case, because our specification results in an effective domestic rate of return that is endogenously determined outside of long-run equilibrium. Our approach thus offers an alternative method of combining an interior steady-state equilibrium and saddlepath transitional dynamics in a small open economy framework with perfect capital mobility. We investigate the influence of status preference by considering two permanent macroeconomic shocks: a government expenditure and a world interest rate disturbance. We show, in particular, that government expenditure shocks have a multiplier effect on the steady-state level of consumption. The multiplier effect arises because agents with a preference for relative wealth respond to macroeconomic disturbances by adjusting both consumption and asset accumulation. This tends to magnify the long-run impact of macroeconomic disturbances, since they alter longrun asset income. We show, in addition, that world interest rate disturbances have, in general, ambiguous effects on the steady-state values of consumption and national debt, although we are able to distinguish three separate cases in our analysis.
Since the present structure of the model is quite simple, many extensions are possible. One obvious extension is to allow agents to accumulate physical capital as well as financial assets. Not only would this introduce investment and output dynamics into the small open economy framework, but would also imply that status preference would depend on the relative holdings of physical capital as well as on relative financial wealth. Preliminary work in this direction has been taken by Fisher and Hof (2003) , who include in their general model of relative wealth preferences a production sector with physical capital. The economy's responses to selected macroeconomic disturbances, such as a world interest rate shock, will, of course, differ from those calculated here. The production structure can be further modified by permitting an endogenous employment decision, in addition to a capital accumulation decision. This would extend the work of Hof (1999) , who has studied the issue of labor supply and status in a closed economy context.
Another avenue in which our model can be extended is in its goods structure. In the present specification, agents consume a single traded good at a fixed unitary price. One possible modification is to assume that agents consume non-traded as well as traded goods and that status, for example, depends on the relative consumption of imported goods. This may be particularly relevant in studying the role of status in developing economies in which goods that generate status are imported from abroad. Finally, the issue of the optimal public policy response to status preference can be explored. The question would be to investigate whether status preference leads to distortions in the decentralized equilibrium and then to calculate the optimal taxes or subsidies that would reproduce the first-best, or social, optimum.
APPENDIX
We state here the first and second partial derivatives of the constant elasticity utility function, equation (11), used to derive the parameterized solution of the model beginning with equations (12a, b): U c ðc; sÞ ¼ ð1 À dÞc Àað1ÀdÞÀd s dð1ÀaÞ > 0; U s ðc; 1Þ ¼ dc ð1ÀdÞð1ÀaÞ s dð1ÀaÞÀ1 > 0 U cc ðc; sÞ ¼ Àð1 À dÞ d þ að1 À dÞ ½ c Àað1ÀdÞÀð1þdÞ s dð1ÀaÞ < 0 U ss ðc; sÞ ¼ Àd 1 À dð1 À aÞ ½ c ð1ÀaÞð1ÀdÞ s dð1ÀaÞÀ2 < 0 U sc ðc; sÞ ¼ dð1 À dÞð1 À aÞc Àað1ÀdÞÀd s dð1ÀaÞÀ1 ðA:1Þ
Using the expressions for U cc , U ss and U sc , we show that strict concavity, U cc U ss À U 2 cs > 0, holds. With the expressions for U c , U cc and U s evaluated in the symmetric equilibrium in which s ¼ 1, we calculate the relationships in (12b) describing the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution, s e , and the effective rate of return, r e .
